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General Report 
Individualism and Communitarianism 
in Contemporary Legal Systems: 
Tensions and Accommodations 
Mary Ann Glendon, General Reporter* 
Nothing, in my view, more deserves attention than the 
intellectual and moral associations in America. American 
political and industrial associations easily catch our eyes, but 
the others tend not to be noticed. And even if we do notice 
them we tend to misunderstand them. . . . However, we 
should recognize that the latter are as necessary a s  the for- 
mer to the American people; perhaps more so. 
Alexis de Tocquevillel 
When the members of two comparative law associations 
come together for a conference, the tacit assumption is that 
comparative methods will advance the understanding of what- 
ever questions are before the house. That assumption led to the 
establishment of the first comparative law societies in France, 
Germany, and England in the late nineteenth century, and it 
presided over the founding of the International Association of 
Legal Science in 1950 and the American Association for the 
Comparative Study of Law in 1951. In their embrace of com- 
parative methods, legal scholars were no different from their 
counterparts in the other human sciences who took for granted 
that serious research ought to include a comparative dimen- 
sion. Emile Durkheim, for example, went so far as to claim that 
"[clomparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology; 
it is sociology i t~elf ."~ F.W. Maitland insisted that "[tlhe Eng- 
* Learned Hand Professor of Law, Harvard University; President, Interna- 
tional Association of Legal Science. 
1. ALWS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 517 (J.P. Mayer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1966). 
2. EmLE D m ,  THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 139 (George Catlin 
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lish lawyer who knew nothing and cared nothing for any sys- 
tem but his own, hardly came in sight of the idea of legal histo- 
rySn3 
The question arises, however: Why, if the benefits of com- 
parative methods are so substantial and obvious, has compara- 
tive law remained a relative backwater in the twentieth-centu- 
ry legal world? No doubt there are several reasons, including 
language barriers and the great difficulty of achieving even 
minimal competence in another legal system while keeping up 
with developments in one's own. Circumstances in  the United 
States, moreover, long made it easy for legal scholars to carry 
on many types of research without casting their gaze beyond 
national borders. In recent years, though, with unprecedented 
global interdependence, and with commerce and communication 
linking all regions of the earth, that posture has become in- 
creasingly untenable. As a result, international legal studies 
are burgeoning to a degree that the founders of comparative 
law organizations could scarcely have imagined. As we stand 
on the verge of this new era, however, it is not altogether clear 
what role comparative law will play in the legal science of the 
future. 
To many legal academics, "international legal studies" 
means international business law, public international law, 
area studies, and little else. The comparative enterprise seems 
quaint and old-fashioned-except so far as foreign law knowl- 
edge can be deployed in the service of some immediate commer- 
cial or political objective. As for comparatists themselves, most 
would admit we are in something of an identity crisis. 
That we have reached such a stage should surprise no one. 
Modern comparative law, after all, took shape in the late nine- 
teenth century a t  a time when differences among European 
national legal systems in many areas were becoming more 
accentuated than they had been in the more distant past or 
than they are now.4 One of the main purposes of the first com- 
parative law associations was therefore quite practical: to aid 
national law reformers by studying the ways in which legisla- 
ed., Sarah Solovay & John H.  Mueller trans., 8th ed. Free Press 1966) (1895). 
3. FREDERIC W. MA~LAND, Why the History of English Law Is Not Written, in 
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM 488 (HAL. Fisher ed., 
1911). 
4. See Gino Gorla & Luigi Moccia, A "Revisiting" of the Comparison between 
"Continental Law" and "English Law" (16th-19th Century), 2 J. LEGAL HIST. 143 
(1981). 
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tors of countries at  comparable stages of social and economic 
development were dealing with the novel problems associated 
with urbanization and industrialization. 
But there was always more to comparative law than that. 
Comparative lawyers are intellectual cousins to sociologists 
who have long known that drawing a line around an area on a 
map and calling it a national boundary does not capture the 
full complexity of norm systems toward which the people inside 
orient their conduct, or the differing contexts of habits, practic- 
es, and attitudes within which various mutually conditioning 
norm systems operate. Many legal scholars, moreover, have 
pursued comparative studies for the same reasons that scholars 
in other disciplines routinely resort to comparative meth- 
ods-for the sake of improved knowledge and understanding, 
and as a way of critically evaluating their own theories and 
hypotheses.5 The attraction of comparative law has never been 
just the study of foreign law as such. It has also been the allure 
of a glimpse into the origins of legal norms; the prospect of a 
better understanding of the efficacy and limits of law; and the 
hope of insight into the connections among law, behavior, ideas, 
and power. In other words, comparative law belongs not only to 
international legal studies, but to basic research in law. 
The question remains concerning the place of comparatists, 
with their peculiar set of practical and theoretical preoccupa- 
tions, in the modern legal world--especially in the world envi- 
sioned by those who believe (as Thomas Reed Powell once put 
it) that the particular gift of lawyers is to be able to think 
about something that is connected t o  something else without 
thinking of what it is connected to.6 No doubt it is useful to 
have lawyers around who think that way, just as it's useful for 
a surgeon who is operating on the hip bone not to be thinking 
about how the hip bone is connected to the thigh bone, and so 
on. But neither medicine nor law can do without people who 
study the functions, contexts, and connections that others, for 
immediate practical purposes, may temporarily have to assume 
away. And functions, contexts, and connections are much of 
what comparative law is all about--whether at the national 
level, the transnational level, o r  in the capillaries of the legal 
5. See Friedrich Kubler, Rechtsvergleiclumg als Grundlagendisziplin der 
Rechtswissenschaft, 32 JURI~NZEITUNG 113 (1977). 
6. See Thurman W .  Arnold, Criminal Attempts+-The Rise and Fall of an Ab- 
straction, 40 YALE LJ. 53, 58 (1930) (noting Powell's observations). 
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system, or in the institutions that compose the fine grain of 
society. 
In the law-saturated societies of the so-called advanced 
 nation^,^ we need now more than ever to know how legal 
norms work in practice, how they interact with other norm 
systems in various social contexts, what indirect effects they 
generate, and what long-term consequences they may entail. 
Comparative law is one way t o  obtain that sort of knowledge. I t  
is Justice Brandeis's 'laboratory" concept writ large? However, 
the very features that furnish comparative methods with their 
great power deprive them of wide appeal. Comparative law, 
like basic research in any other field, takes a long apprentice- 
ship; i t  requires tehwork-not only with one's counterparts in 
other legal systems, but with experts in related disciplines, es- 
pecially those engaged in empirical research. Moreover, its 
outcome is always uncertain; every worthwhile project entails 
some risk of failure. 
The relevance of these matters to the present conference is 
that the theme of individualism and communitarianism re- 
quired a certain willingness to take risks on the part of the 
national reporters. When Cole Durham and I proposed that 
exploratory and open-ended theme, rather than a precisely 
defined topic, we were aware that we were inviting the report- 
ers into relatively uncharted waters. Needless to say, we be- 
lieved the risks would be offset by the chance of being able t o  
demonstrate that cross-national and interdisciplinary team- 
work can, in fact, f ~ K 1  the mission of the IALS to  promote the 
development of legal science through the methods of compira- 
tive law. 
When I say we knew the topic was risky, I mean that, 
when this conference was in the earliest planning stage, we 
knew this in the way that a teenager knows that fast driving 
often produces accidents. We had our first concrete indication 
7. See Andreas Heldrich, The Deluge of Norms, 6 B.C. & COMP. L. REV. 
377 (1983). 
8. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), Justice Brandeis 
called attention to the fact that one of the advantages of the American federal 
system is that it can function as a Yaboratory" where "novel social and economic 
experiments" can be tried by various jurisdictions "without risk to the rest of the 
country." Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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of how risky it was when we tried to come up with a concise 
description that would effectively communicate the general idea 
of the project t o  people from a wide range of legal systems. 
From previous international conferences, we remembered the 
danger of what language teachers call "false friends": words 
that look the same but that have different meanings in differ- 
ent languages. There was, for example, a mysterious panel on 
aeroglisseurs at the Caracas meeting of the International Acad- 
emy-which many people did not attend because they doubted 
whether there was really all that much to be said about the 
law of  glider^.^ Confusion reigned a t  ho the r  roundtable at 
that same meeting, when half the national reporters came pre- 
pared to discuss adoption, while the other half were under the 
impression that the subject was foster care. 
In our efforts to avoid that sort of trap, we chose a descrip- 
tion that was perhaps too general. So it seems appropriate to 
begin this General Report by unpacking the themes we hoped 
to evoke when we chose the title "Individualism and 
Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions 
and Accommodations." I can think of no better way to do that 
than to describe the genesis of the idea for this conference. In 
1989, when Brigham Young University indicated its willingness 
to host an IALS conference, a lively discussion was underway 
in many parts of the world concerning the role that various 
voluntary organizations-such as Solidarity in Poland, Civic 
Forum in Czechoslovakia, and dozens of political discussion 
groups in Hungary-had played in the downfall of statist so- 
cialism.1° 
Among students of politics, this phenomenon reawakened 
interest in the relationship between "society" and "state." 
Vaclav Havel gave voice to the questions that were on many 
minds: How did people who were to all appearances beaten 
down, atomized, cynical, and apathetic find the strength to 
embark on great projects of social and political renewal? Where 
did "young people . . . who [had] never known any other sys- 
tem, find the source of their aspirations for truth, freedom of 
thought, civic courage and civic foresight?"ll Havel's answer 
9. The panel was actually an interesting discussion of the extent to which 
hovercraft were subject to aviation or navigation laws. 
10. See TIMOTHY G. ASH, THE USES OF ADVERSITY: ESSAYS ON THE FATE OF 
CENTRAL EUROPE 47-49, 191, 203 (1989). 
11. Vaclav Havel, New Year's Day Address, FOREIGN BROADCASTING INFORMA- 
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was, in part, that a certain humane and democratic inheritance 
had been "dormant" but somehow kept alive in East European 
societies.12 Speculation on how that inheritance was preserved 
against all odds has led to a revival of interest in Tocqueville's 
theory that communities of memory and mutual aid play essen- 
tial, though insufficiently recognized, roles in underpinning 
democratic forms of government.13 
This is not the place to attempt a summary of the body of 
thought that regards a flourishing associational life as crucial 
to systems of self-government. I will just mention briefly five 
points that are commonly made in that literature. First, and 
most obviously, some types of associations can buttress indi- 
vidual freedom by serving to buffer the power and relativize 
the ideology of the state.14 Second, several kinds of groups can 
nurture the sorts of political skills that a republic requires in 
its citizens as well as its statesmen. To Tocqueville, townships 
and other participatory groups were little schools of citizenship 
where people could form clear ideas about their rights and 
duties, while acquiring habits of deliberation and mutual ac- 
commodation.15 Third, many of the American Founders count- 
ed on small-scale associations to serve as seedbeds for the re- 
publican virtues of moderation, self-restraint, sturdy indepen- 
dence of mind, and respect for the rights of others.16 It was 
TION SERVICE, EASTERN EUROPE, 90-001, Jan. 2, 1990, at 9-10. 
12. Id. 
13. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at  513-17; see also FRANCIS FUKIJYAMA, 
THE END OF HIS~ORY AND THE LAST MAN at  xix (1992); biARY ANN GLENDON, 
RIGHTS TALK 109-44 (1991); THOMAS PANGLE, THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY 105- 
59 (1992); Thomas Pangle, The Constitution's Humun Vision, 86 PUB. INTEREST 77, 
88-90 (1987). 
Social theorists who have laid special emphasis on associational activity without 
stressing its relation to democracy are: EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DMSION OF LABOR 
IN SOCIETY 28-29 (George Simpson trans., Free Press 1933) (1893); PETER 
KROPOTKIN, MUTUAL AID (1972). 
14. In our own day freedom of association has become a necessary guarantee 
against the tyranny of the majority . . . . [Nlo countries need associations 
more . . . than those with a democratic social state. I n  aristocratic na- 
tions secondary bodies form natural associations which hold abuses of 
power in check. In countries where such associations do not exist, if pri- 
vate people did not artificially and temporarily create something like 
them, I see no other dike to hold back tyranny of whatever sort . . . . 
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 192. 
15. See id. at  62-70. 
16. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 55, at 346; 57, at 353 (James Madison), NO. 84, 
at  544 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also FORREST MCDON- 
ALD, NOWS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSMTUTION 
71-72, 190-91 (1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVO- 
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mainly in family settings, schools, churches, and other close- 
knit communities, they believed, that citizens would develop 
those qualities of intellect and character. Fourth, the habit of 
accomplishing goals and projects through mutual aid has been 
thought to prevent citizens from becoming too dependent on 
government. When people habitually look to government for so- 
lutions to their problems, Tocqueville famously wrote, they 
become subjects, but no longer citizens." Finally, in the twen- 
tieth century, as the liberal democracies have taken on exten- 
sive welfare responsibilities, many associations have attracted 
yet another sort of interest-of a more practical and immediate 
nature. Caught in the pinch between rising demands for servic- 
es on the one hand and the limits of high taxation on the other, 
policymakers are increasingly experimenting with the idea that 
the state can promote the delivery of services such as health, 
education, and child care more economically, efficiently, and 
humanely through nongovernmental groups than it can provide 
them itself.18 
No sooner had the structures of civil society begun t o  be 
reappraised, however, than many old fears-and a few new 
ones-concerning them began to surface. To many people, the 
very idea awakens fears of civil strife, crude majoritarianism, 
or the glorification of the group at the expense of the individu- 
al. Since I have listed five ways in which communities have 
been regarded as undergirding democratic republics, let me 
mention five concerns that are most frequently expressed about 
them. First, there is the notion that allegiance to what Madison 
called  faction^"^^ foments civil discord, impedes national co- 
hesion, and threatens the state. Second, to many intellectuals, 
the idea of community connotes backwardness and narrow- 
mindedness. A suspicious attitude toward "small town values" 
finds support not only among collectivist thinkers (Marx and 
Engels wrote scornfully of the "idiocy of rural life"),2° but 
among libertarians (John Stuart Mill deplored the stifling ef- 
LUTION 333-34 (1992). 
17. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 93-94; cf. KROPOTRIN, supra note 13. 
18. See PETER BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: 
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977); RALPH M. KRAMER, 
VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN THE WELFARE STATE (1981); BETWEEN STATES AND MAR- 
KETS: T m  VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Robert Wuthnow ed., 
1991). 
19. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison). 
20. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 14 (1955). 
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fect of "custom" on the free development of gifted individu- 
a l ~ ) . ~ ~  Third, the frequent figurative use of the word "commu- 
nity" to designate a whole nation or ethnic group evokes associ- 
ations of racism and totalitarianism, especially in light of the 
atrocities perpetrated in the name of "folkish community" 
(Volksgemeinschaft) in the 1930s and 1940s.~~ Fourth, in the 
period of increased attentiveness to "universal" individual hu- 
man rights after World War 11, a heightened consciousness has 
arisen concerning the ways in which social subgroups can be 
oppressive t o  their own members, as well as intolerant of out- 
siders. Finally, to many people, the current rise of militant 
nationalism and fundamentalism in various parts of the world 
has seemed to confirm fears associated with group loyalties. 
It will be noted that most of those fears are based on con- 
cepts of communitarianism that equate it variously with inter- 
est-group pluralism, nationalism, or majoritarianism. This 
suggests that some refinement of the issues is in order, and 
that distinctions must be made not only among particular sorts 
of groups, but according to the actual relations among the 
state, the market, and the rest of civil society at different peri- 
ods in history and in different cultural contexts. The debate 
about individualism and communitarianism, as the French 
reporter points out, is an old one, but it is one whose terms 
alter their weight and meanings under different historical 
conditions. Depending on the circumstances, the sorts of groups 
that in some countries at some phases of historical develop- 
ment promote individual liberty and participatory politics can 
operate in other times and places to oppress individuals and to 
stifle political life. 
In 1989, with society unexpectedly asserting itself against 
the state in many parts of the world, the time seemed propi- 
tious for the IALS to explore the legal dimensions of these 
perennial questions that were taking new forms in political 
theory. In particular, it seemed worthwhile to inquire into the 
legal status and treatment in various countries of certain espe- 
cially important social groups-ranging from families, local 
21. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts 
Press 1956) (1859). 
22. National Socialism, like other ideologies claiming community on a grandiose 
scale, was in fad hostile to local communities and subcultures which competed 
with the state for loyalty. Just as Manr distrusted p u p s  that tended to perpetu- 
ate "bourgeois vestiges," National Socialists regarded many religious and communal 
associations as Reichsfeinde (enemies of the Reich). 
GENERALREPORT 
schools, churches and neighborhoods, to larger educational, 
workplace, religious, and professional associations, and to vari- 
ous kinds of governmental organizations at the local and com- 
munal level. The United States seemed to be an ideal setting 
for such a conference, for, as Tocqueville had memorably ob- 
served, "Better use has been made of association and this pow- 
erful instrument of action has been applied to more varied aims 
in America than anywhere else in the In his travels, 
he was repeatedly struck by the fact that, "Americans of all 
ages, all stations of life, and all types of dispositions, are for- 
ever forming  association^."^^ 
Tocqueville marvelled at the variety of associations which 
had no obvious political o r  commercial object: 
There are. . . a thousand different types-religious, moral, 
serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large 
and very minute. Americans combine to give fetes, found 
seminaries, build churches, distribute books, and send mis- 
sionaries to the antipodes, [to proclaim truths, and t o  instill 
What made these nonpolitical groups politically significant, so 
far as he was concerned, was the array of skills and attitudes 
that they fostered. When Americans wanted something built, 
repaired, cleaned up, praised, o r  propagated, he observed, they 
just gathered a group of people together and did it--rather 
than appealing t o  "a powerful stranger called the govern- 
ment.y'26 When you look behind any new undertaking in the 
United States, he claimed, "you are sure to find an association," 
whereas "in France you would find the government or in Eng- 
land some territorial [p~tentatel ."~~ 
In sum, then, Cole Durham and I were confident that we 
had an excellent topic for comparative examination, and one 
that was particularly well suited for exploration in an Ameri- 
can setting. But when we tried to put our idea in the form of a 
proposal to the IALS, we had great difficulty in deciding what 
23. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 189. 
24. Id. at 513. "[Ehen the women," Tocqueville reported, "often go to public 
meetings and forget household cares while they listen to political speeches." Id. at 
243. For a description of the rich associational life in certain parts of Europe in 
the nineteenth century, see KROPOTKIN, supra note 13, at 223-92. 
25. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 513. 
26. Id. at 93. 
27. Id. at 513. 
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t o  call it. What made this problem so intractable, however, was 
precisely what made it seem promising from an intellectual 
point of view. The main reason we could not easily come up 
with a title for this conference is that the vocabulary and con- 
ceptual apparatus of modern law and politics is primarily 
geared to the relations among individuals, the state, and the 
market. Legal theory lacks adequate terms and concepts for 
grappling with the "thousand different types" of social groups 
that provide the immediate context for most people's lives and 
that flourish within and among the megastructures of the state 
and the market. Since the existence of a mass of material that 
does not fit any existing theoretical framework is a classic 
invitation t o  further research, we regarded the naming problem 
as, on balance, an encouraging sign. 
We turned next to neighboring disciplines for aid in fram- 
ing a title, and settled initially on a shorthand expression with 
a venerable pedigree in social theory. The term is "civil soci- 
ety," an expression that was frequently on the lips of opposi- 
tionist political figures like Havel, Konrad, and Michnik in the 
1 9 8 0 ~ . ~ ~  Czeslaw Milosz, the Nobel Prize-winning Polish poet, 
tersely conveyed the spirit in which that term was used when 
he wrote in 1986, "Quite contrary to  the predictions of 
Marx, . . . instead of the withering away of the state, the 
state . . , is eating away the substance of society."29 The de- 
struction of society by the state, according to Milosz, was "the 
basic issue of the twentieth century"-and not only in what 
were then the socialist countries, but also in the liberal democ- 
racies of the West.30 But when Cole and I submitted a propos- 
al to the IALS for a colloquium on "Civil Society," the Executive 
Committee of the IALS rejected it as likely to be too unfamiliar 
or confusing to many people. On reflection, we agreed. 
When we went back t o  the drawing board, moreover, we 
realized that "civil society" was not quite appropriate for what 
we had in mind. For "civil society," as Hegel, Marx, and many 
contemporary European thinkers, such as Milosz and Havel 
have used that term, includes the structures and systems of the 
market. But in many countries, the size and power of business 
entities has come to  rival the state. Indeed, as Gunther 
Teubner points out in the German report, the distinction be- 
28. ASH, supra note 10, at 48, 191, 203; Havel, supra note ll, at 9-10. 
29. An Interview with Czeslaw Milosz, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 27, 1986, at 34. 
30. Id. 
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tween market and state has become blurred. Those facts 
prompted the American sociologist Robert Bellah to offer an 
addendum to Milosz's diagnosis by pointing out that it is not 
only the state, .but the market economy, that can take a toll on 
the little groups-families, schools, neighborhoods, and so 
on-that compose the 'life-world" of most men, women, and 
children.31 
For our purposes, then, the term "civil society" was both 
underinclusive (because it leaves out small, participatory, gov- 
ernmental bodies, like the New England townships that so 
enchanted Tocqueville) and overinclusive (because it includes 
huge private organizations and interest groups that are as 
inaccessible to participation as large public entities). Taking 
our bearings from Tocqueville, we wanted to concentrate, not 
on national parties and pressure groups, or on the 
megastructures of state and market, but on the smaller social 
subsystems whose political significance, according to 
Tocqueville, had been generally ignored. 
So what to do? There were a number of sociological terms 
that came close-intermediate associations, secondary groups, 
and mediating structures. We could have gone to political sci- 
ence for a snappy acronym like QUANGOS (quasiautonomous 
nongovernmental organizations). But terms like "group" or 
"organization" did not capture the porous boundaries and over- 
lapping memberships of associational activity in contemporary 
societies. Moreover, as Teubner points out, social subsystems 
do not just "mediate" vertically between individuals and the 
state. They mediate between political discourse and the dis- 
courses of specialized subsystems, and they mediate horizontal- 
ly with each other. What we really needed was a title that 
would convey a sense of the dynamic interactions among 
spheres of meaning, as well as of the constantly changing rela- 
tions among individuals and the various sorts of communities 
to which they belong. For a conference title that would evoke 
the law's relation to social systems and subsystems in constant 
flux and communication, we could have borrowed Teubner's 
own term-"autopoietic law."32 But it is fair to say that 
31. ROBERT BELLAH, The Invasion of the Money World, in REBUILDING THE 
NEST 227, 228 (David Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990) (borrowing the term "life 
worldu from Jurgen Habermas). 
32. Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A 
NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1 (Gunther Teubner ed. 1988). 
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autopoiesis is not yet a household word. So we invited Teubner 
to be a reporter, and went on searching for a title. 
Finally, we resolved that we could do no better than to 
imitate the spirit of the draftsmen of the French Civil Code. 
That is, we aimed for a general formulation that we hoped 
would be fkcond en cons6quences--one that would make up in 
suggestiveness for what it lacked in ~pecificity.~' Our hope, 
after all, was not to bind the imaginations of our national re- 
porters, but to  kindle them. In that frame of mind, for better or  
worse, we settled on "Individualism and Communitarianism in 
Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations." 
The project, as we presented it to the national reporters, 
was to consider the extent to which the individual or communi- 
ties (variously defined) are emphasized in specific parts of their 
national legal systems. They were asked to trace the ways that 
tensions between individualism and communitarianism are 
manifested, as well as the ways in which accommodations are 
achieved. This was a vein which the Belgian Reporter, Marie- 
Th6r6se Meulders-Klein, had successfully explored in her bril- 
liant comparative studies of family law,34 and thus there was 
reason to think that similar investigations in other areas would 
be fruitful as well. In particular, we asked the reporters to 
consider the legal treatment of five overlapping types of social 
environments of great importance in the daily lives of most 
individuals: families, local communities, religious organiza- 
tions, educational institutions, and the world of work (including 
workers' and professional associations). In keeping with the 
usual IALS practice, we invited the reporters to concentrate 
their efforts on as few or as many subtopics as they wished. 
On the basis of the reports they produced, it seems clear 
that, whatever the defects and ambiguities of the topic, they 
did not in the least dampen the creative impulses of the report- 
ers. No doubt this is because the Scientific Director of the 
IALS, Petar Sar~evie, secured the participation of a truly re- 
markable group of scholars. Not only are they among the 
world's experts on various branches of the topic, they are all 
distinguished comparatists. 
33. Portalis et al., Discours preliminuire, quoted in ~ H U R  VON MEHREN & 
JAMES GORDLEY, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 54 (2d ed. 1977). 
34. E.g., Marie-Th6rBse Meulders-Klein, Familk, &at et s6curitk Donomique 
d'ezistence d la fin du XX&me s&k, in 2 FAMILLE, $TAT ET S ~ U R ~ T ~  $CONOMIQUE 
D'EXISTENCE 1077 (Marie-Th6rBse Meulders-Klein & John Eekelaar eds., 1988). 
3851 GENERAL REPORT 397 
The national reports disclose a group of countries engaged 
in what is, in a sense, a common quest: the search for an opti- 
mal relationship between private ordering and public regula- 
tion; for an appropriate balance between individual rights and 
the limits on those rights that  are required for the sake of life 
in an organized society; and for effective methods of responding 
to the needs of their citizens without fostering an entitlement 
mentality. In most places, however, these goals are being pur- 
sued with little attention to specialized social subsystems, or to 
forms of private ordering other than market ordering. Most 
importantly, the reports demonstrate that the search does not 
begin with a clean slate in a mythical state of nature. I t  takes 
place under specific historical circumstances that importantly 
af'fect ideas of what is optimal as well as the possibilities and 
means of achieving various political goals. 
The tensions and accommodations between individualism 
and communitarianism appear in quite a different light, for 
example, in a country just emerging from state socialism like 
Poland, from the way they manifest themselves in the liberal 
welfare republics of Western Europe, or in a country like the 
United States, which has only slowly and partially made the 
transition from a liberal republic to a liberal welfare republic. 
Or again, as Tatsuo Inoue's report illustrates, between a coun- 
try like Japan where certain structures of civil society are rela- 
tively strong and countries where social ties have become more 
attenuated. 
A. The Transition from Socialism: The Case of Poland 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, few people could remain 
unmoved and unimpressed by the way in which Polish labor 
and religious organizations had been able to preserve and nur- 
ture the sparks of a vision of human freedom that stood in 
stark opposition to official ideology. According to  the Polish 
reporter, however, the adoption of "civil society" as a rallying 
cry took place without much "profound theoretical reflection" on 
its meaning. Though "the myth of civil society" played a central 
role in democratic oppositional thinking in the 1970s and 
1980s, he reports that it has more or less faded from view in 
the years since 1989. 
At present, civil society has taken a back seat to the "most 
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important task" of the time, namely, establishing a liberal 
social state with constitutional protection for individual and 
economic freedom. In this process of transition to  a new form of 
government, the legacy of civil society has been overshadowed 
by a more recent inheritance-the legacy of socialism. Although 
the institutions of civil society, as carriers of democratic hu- 
manism (or "bourgeois vestiges7'), may have contributed to the 
downfall of state socialism, it now appears far from certain 
whether they possess enough vitality to  play a major role in 
raising and sustaining a democratic republic. Ironically, the 
question now seems to be whether "socialist vestiges" in the 
form of habits and attitudes acquired over the past few decades 
are strong enough to block efforts at  democratic renewal. 
Of the acquired habits and attitudes to which the Polish 
reporter drew particular attention, one syndrome in particular 
was anticipated by T ~ c ~ u e v i l l e . ~ ~  Socialism, with its "attrac- 
tive set of promises" (guaranteed employment, broad social 
safety net) fostered a mentality of dependency and entitlement 
that is now in tension with privatization. Another vestige 
seems to contradict Tocqueville's expectations. For it appears 
that participation in small groups can serve as a distraction 
from, rather than as a school for, citizenship in the larger 
sense. Paradoxically, "participation" in governing the workplace 
may actually have figured in the subordination of employees by 
giving them a sense of dignity, of belonging, and a certain feel- 
ing of liberty. "There is no doubt," according to the reporter, 
"that a worker's participation in the management of an enter- 
prise was a particular compensation for the lack . . . of political 
rights and liberties." Participation, i t  seems, may or may not be 
a means of empowerment, depending on whether the group 
that serves as the theater of participation (union, local govern- 
ment) itself has real power, including the ability to set condi- 
tions for its own development. 
The picture of the current East European scene painted by 
the Polish reporter is that of a 'landscape after a battle," with 
the "state" under halting construction and "society" in relative 
disarray. He observes a "pendulum effect" as governments react 
to the extremes of the totalitarian past by promoting relatively 
unlimited individualism, especially in the economic sphere, 
without sufficient attention to the general welfare. In Poland, 
35. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 86-95. 
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he notes that the newly constituted state is attempting to cre- 
ate conditions favorable to civil society through laws that dele- 
gate power to local communities and provide organizational 
frameworks for associations. Yet he provides several examples 
that raise substantial doubts about whether this top-down 
strategy significantly promotes either decentralization of power 
or individual freedom. 
B. European Liberal Welfare States 
The Polish reporter theorizes that the individualism- 
communitarianism discussion is a discourse peculiarly linked to 
the democratic liberal (rule-of-law) state, where political theory 
in principle rules out the notion that either one ism or the 
other should prevail. The idea that neither individualism nor 
communitarianism should predominate as a matter of principle 
does in fact seem to be part of the historical and philosophical 
inheritance of the liberal welfare states of the European conti- 
nent. But that idea is less clearly a feature of American and 
Japanese political thought and practice. In fact, the American 
and Japanese reports suggest that a certain emphasis in princi- 
ple on individualism (in the former case) or communitarianism 
(in the latter) is generally regarded as compatible with liberal 
democracy in those countries. Not surprisingly, these differenc- 
es in emphasis seem to be attributable in large measure to the 
different cultural contexts within which democratic experi- 
ments have been introduced. I t  is not only in the emerging 
democracies of Eastern Europe where vestiges of the past cast 
long shadows on, and limit the possibilities of, the present. 
The French and Belgian reports are the most consistent 
with the Polish reporter's general observation. The French 
reporter remarks that "the idea today is to attack excesses of 
both [individualism and communitarianism], and to protect the 
sacrosanct human rights (which are primarily individual 
rights) without compromising the interests of society." He re- 
lates these attitudes to the inheritance of the French Revolu- 
tion, pointing out that excessive liberty, especially in the eco- 
nomic sphere, can run counter to another revolutionary ideal: 
equality. I t  is generally accepted today, he writes, that individ- 
ual rights are not absolute, but are subject to certain limits im- 
posed by collective interests and by the requirements of life in 
society. Accepted, too, is collective responsibility for an increas- 
ing number of risks, manifested in the appearance alongside 
traditional political and civil rights of new types of "social" 
400 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
rights-to employment, education, health care, and so on. 
The spirit of the French Revolution enters into the French 
and Belgian reports (and has affected much of continental 
Europe) in yet another way. The institutions of civil society 
were particular targets of attack in the revolutionary period. 
All the corps interddiaires of the old r e g i m e t h e  family, the 
Church, craft guilds and associations-were to be dismantled. 
Under the slogan "No intermediaries between citizen and 
state," revolutionary legislation introduced divorce, broke up 
landed estates, confiscated church property, and abolished the 
guilds. For Tocqueville's French readers, that experience was 
the silent term of comparison in his admiring description of 
American "intellectual and moral associations." When he wrote 
of American families and religious groups, Tocqueville was 
wrestling with the question of what social supports would be 
available to sustain the effort to construct a free, egalitarian, 
democratic polity in his own country. In extolling the virtues of 
the New England township, he was lamenting the virtual de- 
struction of local and communal government in France. 
Though the family quickly regained legislative favor in the 
postrevolutionary period, and workers' associations gradually 
achieved legitimacy later on, the powerful myth of la nation, 
une et indivisible still casts a cloud of suspicion over groups 
that might compete with the state for allegiance. Over the 
nineteenth century, as the French reporter points out, the 
structures of civil society continued to develop-some organized 
by the state; some encouraged by the state; some ignored and 
tolerated by the state; some with legal personality, others with- 
out. In the current period, he calls attention to efforts at decen- 
tralization in administrative law, and to the proliferation of 
powerful interest and pressure groups-groups that awaken old 
fears associated with what Rousseau called "partial societ- 
i e ~ . " ~ ~  
The ambiguous roles of powerful economic and political 
associations in the polity are of special interest to the German 
reporter. He maintains that "today a new political arrangement 
between the state and private organizations is emerg- 
ing-which I would call 'polycorporatism.' " Polycorporatism, 
according to Teubner, is characterized by a symbiosis between 
the public and private sectors, with government agencies and 
36. JeanJacques Rousseau, Social Contract, reprinted in THE SOCIAL CON- 
TRACT AND DISCOURSES 247-48 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1973). 
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private-sector actors cooperating in various ways, with govern- 
mental decision-making power to  some extent dispersed, and 
with group autonomy to  some extent sacrificed. He theorizes 
that a new kind of "polycorporate state" has come into be- 
ing-taking the form, in Germany, of political parties, plus-on 
the one hand-a network of governmental bureaucracies that 
have sloughed off (privatized) much of the responsibility for 
policymaking, and-on the other hand-a network of nongov- 
ernmental organizations that have acquired quasigovernmental 
powers and duties. 
As for the smaller-scale associations that were of special 
interest to Tocqueville, let us now turn to the Belgian report on 
European family law and the French and German reports on 
the world of work. 
I .  Individualism and communitarianism in  family law 
In family law, as in other areas, legislators do not write on 
a social tabula rasa. The Belgian reporter's comparative essay 
emphasizes the profound effects that history and philosophy 
have had on the divergent understandings of the individual 
and the family (and, one might add, of law and the state) that 
are operating in the Anglo-American and Romano-Germanic 
legal traditions. The significance of those differences extends 
far beyond family law; their spirit penetrates every corner of 
the respective legal systems. Thus the Belgian reporter's survey 
of comparative family law sheds light on many issues that 
recur in the legal treatment of local communities, schooling, 
religion, and the world of work. 
One feature that distinguishes the continental European 
family laws from the Anglo-American is their relative emphasis 
on the group as such. I t  was in family law where French revo- 
lutionary assaults on intermediate groups were most short- 
lived. To Portalis, the chief draftsman of the Civil Code of 1804, 
the family (the legitimate family defined in the civil law) was 
the basis of civil society: "It is the cradle of the state, and the 
domestic virtues are civic virtues." The French Civil Code (and 
most other European civil codes) established a highly detailed 
system of rights and duties among family members, animated 
by a principle of "solidarity." The Belgian reporter remarks, 
T h e  continental jurist is in fact astonished at the relative 
absence throughout the history of the common law of rules of 
substantive law organizing family relations as such . . . ." 
Despite recent transformations in family behavior and 
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ideas about family life, especially since the 1960s, the Belgian 
reporter fmds that continental European law (with the excep- 
tion of most of the Nordic countries) still maintains something 
of the ideal of family solidarity. She acknowledges the appear- 
ance, alongside traditional ideas of family solidarity, of a 
"postmodern" family ideology that regards the group as merely 
in the service of its individual members as they pursue their 
separate aims. She notes, as well, the increasing challenges to 
traditional legal concepts of family life from unmarried and 
same-sex couples pressing for legal recognition. She wonders 
whether the increased emphasis on children's rights may be 
the entering wedge of a new form of individualism in continen- 
tal family law. Nevertheless, she finds that, in responding t o  
these challenges, the Romano-Germanic legal systems so far 
"have evolved in a manner that conforms to their own tradi- 
tions." Thus, for example, obligations of family solidarity have 
been broadened to include children born outside legal marriage, 
but unmarried couples a s  such have not achieved a legal status 
equivalent to the status of marriage. 
She discerns similar tensions and accommodations in pub- 
lic law. Though most European constitutions expressly recog- 
nize the family as a social institution that must be accorded 
special protection by the state, there is vigorous controversy 
over the definition of the family and over the relation of family 
protection to the individual rights that are protected in the 
same documents. European legislatures, however, have man- 
aged t o  reach a variety of pragmatic accommodations of com- 
peting values. Confronted with considerable diversity in con- 
temporary sexual and family behavior, the continental welfare 
states have attempted to  steer a course that provides assis- 
tance to persons in need without creating new legal statuses 
and without penalizing families that are based on marriage. 
The same overall accommodationist trends are manifested 
in the activities of supranational European institutions. The 
European Social Charter engages the member nations to  pro- 
tect the family by setting conditions for its flourishing (plein 
epanouissement). Protection of the family must be accom- 
plis hed, however, within the context of the norms established 
by the European Convention on Human Rights. As the Belgian 
reporter points out, there is a certain internal tension in ECHR 
Article 8's limited protection of the right to "respect for private 
and familial life." The right to respect for private life concerns 
the individual alone, while the right to respect for familial life 
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concerns both the individual and society (society's interest in 
the family is explicitly recognized in many constitutions and 
international instruments). On the basis of recent decisions by 
the European Court of Human Rights, however, the reporter 
concludes that the tension can be alleviated, though not elimi- 
nated, by treating the notions of private life and family life as 
complementary. 
The task, as she sees it, is to work out, under modern 
circumstances, "a carefully thought-through equilibrium be- 
tween individual rights and duties, but also between individual 
interests and the general welfare, including the welfare of the 
family, less as an institution, than as a fragile and vulnerable 
human community." Her analysis, highly nuanced and atten- 
tive to numerous trouble spots, comports with the observations 
of the Polish and French reporters: at least within the vision of 
liberal democracy that prevails in continental Western Europe, 
neither individualism nor communitarianism is permitted to 
predominate as a matter of principle. 
2. The world of work 
The French report depicts a legal system that appears at 
fxst glance to be supportive of organized labor in myriad ways. 
France has moved so far from its former hostility to workers' 
associations that the reporter can now speak of "the unceasing 
extension of powers granted to unions." This legislative trend 
has been accompanied, moreover, with a fm commitment to 
union autonomy in the form of a "remarkable abstention" from 
intervention in the internal affairs of unions. This commitment 
has weathered many shifts in regime and ideology. 
Paradoxically, however, unionism in France is more sharp- 
ly in decline than in other European countries. The decline is 
so severe that the reporter describes the situation as reaching a 
critical threshold. The organized sector has dropped to about 10 
percent of the entire labor force, and to only 5.6 percent of 
private sector employees. How is one to account for this state of 
affairs? The reporter observes: ",If French unions today are 
facing real difficulties, this is certainly not because the State 
has denied them means of action: on the contrary, the law has 
constantly extended their prerogatives." Moreover, he adds, the 
public authorities increasingly include the unions along with 
other groups within the framework of social "partnership." 
Among the causes of the decline of unionism, the French 
reporter particularly emphasizes that loss of confidence by the 
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rank-and-file in their leaders has led to apathy and disaffec- 
tion. With bureaucratization, internal divisions, and excessive 
politicization, union officials have grown out of touch with their 
members. The French reporter notes, too, that there is less of a 
contradiction than may fist appear between the increasing 
integration of the unions into the apparatus of the state and 
the unions' loss of influence with the majority of workers. The 
German reporter agrees, describing the symbiosis between 
government and "big interest organizations" as creating a "shift 
in the legitimation gap9'-with the burden of enforcing and 
explaining policy decisions now falling on the cooperating orga- 
nizations rather than on public officials. 
At another level, the French reporter notes that declining 
confidence by employees in the benefits of collective action 
reflects many of the same .social attitudes that are associated 
with changes in family behavior. 
In the world of work there is, quite evidently, a phenomenon 
of withdrawal into oneself that is the sign of an increasingly 
splintered and divided society. Everyone thinks that it is in 
his interest t o  fend for himself and strives only to promote his 
personal aspirations: this marks the end of the famous "work- 
er solidarityn of the heyday of unionism in former times. The 
unions today have fewer and fewer "militantsn and more and 
more "clients," who look to them only for the satisfaction of 
their immediate interests and abandon them as soon as they 
no longer find them necessary. 
Certain well-intentioned legislative measures also may 
have played a role in the decline of unionism. Has the French 
state, in a sense, arrogated to itself many of the roles that 
unions in other nations perform? By extensively regulating 
numerous aspects of wages, hours, and working conditions that 
in other countries are left to the collective bargaining process, 
the state may have undermined the unions' traditional func- 
tions and encouraged them to transform themselves into lobby- 
ing and pressure groups. 
Whatever the explanation, the French reporter does not 
hesitate to characterize the current situation as dangerous. 
Workers have become increasingly dependent for protection on 
the vicissitudes of politics and the market, while employers and 
society in general are increasingly vulnerable to "spontaneous 
eruptions" of discontent. A stable democratic regime, he con- 
cludes, not only needs unions, but needs them to be strong and 
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independent enough t o  perform their roles effectively and to 
merit the confidence of workers. 
C. A Liberal Welfare State with Emphasis on the Individual: 
The Case of the United States 
The propositions about individualism and communitarian- 
ism that the French reporter describes as generally accepted 
are actually more controversial in the United States than in 
continental Europe. In America, although the frontier has long 
vanished, the myth of the self-reliant, lonely, proud, individual 
still exerts a powerful influence on culture and law. That myth 
contributes to the distinctive character of American family law 
and labor law, and helps to explain the late and reluctant 
American acceptance of the welfare state. I t  is worth recalling 
that a t  the time of the American Founding, four-fifths of the 
nonslave population was self-employed in family farms and 
busines~es.~' Most of the descendants of those independent 
artisans and farmers-along with successive waves of immi- 
grants--eventually joined the ranks of wage-earners. But their 
inherited cultural values constituted a significant obstacle to 
the development of worker solidarity in the United States.38 
American wage earners "grew up in a society which stressed 
the ideals of classlessness, individual initiative, and opportuni- 
ty.'739 
1. Family law 
From the perspective of the Belgian reporter, Anglo-Amen- 
can family law "seems to bear the mark of a profoundly individ- 
ualistic philosophy, hostile to official normative or judicial 
interference in private and familial matters." She lists certain 
features of Anglo-American family law that are particularly 
surprising to continental observers: the absence, in  most juris- 
dictions, of the concept of a marital property regime; the ab- 
sence of clear rules concerning the obligations of parents to- 
ward children; the absence of support obligations outside the 
nuclear family; the liberty to change one's name and the ab- 
37. Robert Heilbroner, Boom and Crash, NEW YORKER, Aug. 28, 1978, at 52, 
68. 
38. See Alice Kessler-Harris, Trade Unions Mirror Society in Conflict Between 
Collectivism and Individualism, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 1987, at 32. 
39. Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor 
Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1403 (1971). 
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sence of "family names"; and the relative freedom of testation 
that prevails in common law countries. In sum, many of the 
legal expressions of "solidarity" that are so prominent in civil 
law systems are completely lacking in Anglo-American family 
Where federal laws and programs affecting family life are 
concerned, the passing observation of the Belgian reporter that 
"family associations" are among the most important interest 
groups on the European political scene may help to explain 
certain aspects of American distinctiveness. Originally formed 
with a pronatalist bent in response t o  the population losses 
inflicted by World War I, large broad-based European family 
associations have evolved into powerful lobbies for child-raising 
families.41 These groups, which have no counterpart in the 
United States, have played important roles in the political 
processes that have produced family allowances, maternity 
leaves, family housing subsidies, and other protective measures 
in Europe. Of equal importance, they have assured continuous 
high national visibility for family issues. In the United States, 
though many interest groups claim to represent women or to 
speak for children, there is no organized voice for parents. The 
fact that so much of family law is state law, moreover, has kept 
some issues (like divorce reform) from receiving a full national 
airing. 
Further contrasts appear between the United States and 
continental Europe when family protection clashes with indi- 
vidual liberty in the area of fundamental rights. Unlike most 
European constitutions, the American Constitution contains no 
mention of the family. Family protection has gained recognition 
as a constitutional value in certain Supreme Court decisions, 
but only sporadically.42 Individual rights, of course, are well- 
developed in American constitutional law. The Belgian reporter 
has rendered a service by illuminating the nuanced, but signifi- 
40. But see Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
865 (1989) for a discussion of some specifically legal reasons for the absence of 
solidaristic norms, as well as of the ways in which Anglo-American family law does 
hold up family solidarity as an ideal. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
41. See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 425 
(1972). 
42. See generally Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kin- 
ship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 l)rlICH. 
L. REV. 463 (1983). 
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cant, differences in the understandings of human personhood 
that can inform the concept of the "individual" where funda- 
mental rights are concerned. Legal norms and policy choices 
cannot help but be affected by whether, as in the American 
legal system, the individual tends to be imagined as autono- 
mous and self-determining, or, as in the Romano-Germanic 
systems, as constituted in important ways by and through his 
relations with others. 
It must be stressed, however, that these differences, 
though significant, are differences mainly of emphasis and 
degree. The legal systems of continental Western Europe, like 
the American system, assign a high priority to the free develop- 
ment of the autonomous individual. They accord somewhat 
greater attention than the United States legal system does, 
though, to the social contexts, including the family, within 
which that development takes place. Thus, for example, deci- 
sions of the European Court of Human Rights treat the 
individual's right to private life as protecting a sphere for his 
f d  and free development, yet they do so within the limits ex- 
pressly mentioned in Article 8, and with recognition that priva- 
cy rights are implicitly conditioned by other rights protected in 
the Convention. The United States Supreme Court, by contrast, 
tends to envision privacy as "a right to be let alone,"43 and as 
a species of individual liberty that trumps a wide range of 
other social values. 
2. Legal treatment of religious associations 
The American report is the only one of the national reports 
to give more than passing attention t o  the subject of individual- 
ism and communitarianism in the legal treatment of religious 
associations. The comparative approach of the report, however, 
is especially illuminating in this complex and paradoxical area. 
Individualism and communitarianism are intertwined in the 
religion language of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitu- 
tion, which protects the free exercise of religion and forbids the 
federal government to make any law respecting the establish- 
ment of religion. The establishment language seems t o  have 
been intended t o  prevent the national government from inter- 
fering with the diverse state and local arrangements concern- 
43. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK ch. 3 ("The Lone Rights Bearer") 
(1991). 
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ing religious exercise. Those arrangements at  the time of the 
Founding ranged from disestablishment to official state estab- 
lishments, with various cooperative accommodations in be- 
tween.44 Until the 1940s, the federal government remained 
almost entirely aloof from religious liberty issues. The most 
notable exception, resulting in denial of constitutional protec- 
tion to religious polygyny, occurred because Utah was not a 
sovereign state, but a territory under federal jurisdiction. 
In the mid-twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court 
began to make parts of the Bill of Rights, including the religion 
language, binding on the states. In that process, an individual- 
istic approach prevailed in two respects: (1) Religion was re- 
peatedly characterized in Court opinions as a purely private 
individual experience; and (2) The Court's understanding of 
free exercise, with some  exception^:^ ignored the fact that for 
many individuals religious freedom has important associational 
and institutional aspects. At the root of these understandings 
seems to be the implicit concept of the human person noted by 
the Belgian reporter in the family context: the autonomous, 
freely choosing, self-constituting individual. The result of ne- 
glecting the social dimension of human personhood has been a 
bias against individuals and groups for whom free exercise of 
religion is not merely a private affair but inseparable from 
participation in a worshipping community. 
The Court's expansive concept of what it means to officially 
"establish" religion, moreover, has impeded legislative experi- 
ments with creative use of mediating structures to deliver so- 
cial services. The tendency of the establishment decisions is 
either to exclude religious associations from such programs or 
to allow them to  participate only at the price of checking their 
religious beliefs at the door.46 
Nowhere has the influence of the Court's excessively nar- 
row view of free exercise and its inflated concept of establish- 
ment been more apparent than in the cases involving educa- 
tion. Here, American law has had important effects on the 
associations that serve as schools for citizenship and seedbeds 
of civic virtue. The education cases involve not only schools, but 
free exercise rights of individuals, freedom of religious associa- 
44. Wallace v. J&ee, 472 U.S. 38, 99 n.4 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
45. Notably, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
46. That is the practical effect of the "entanglement" prong of the test in Lem- 
on v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
3851 GENERALREPORT 409 
tion, and the ability of families to control the education of their 
children. As the law presently stands, the government-run 
schools are required t o  be rigorously secular, while parents who 
desire to protect their children from governmental indoctrina- 
tion that is profoundly at  odds with their religious convictions 
can do so only if they can afford private education. The Ameri- 
can report performs a valuable service by showing that other 
pluralistic liberal democracies have found means to accord 
equal respect to believers and nonbelievers without banishing 
religion entirely from public educational settings or without 
denying public assistance t o  families who experience those 
settings as an assault on their deepest values. Ironically, the 
American legal treatment of religious groups resembles the 
stance of pre-1989 socialist countries more than it does the 
tolerant approaches of the other liberal democracies to which 
we ordinarily compare ourselves. 
D. A Liberal Welfare State with Emphasis on the Group: 
The Case of Japan 
The Japanese report, like the American, reveals an asym- 
metric balance between individualism and communitarianism, 
but with a tendency to resolve the tensions in the opposite way. 
The reporter describes Japanese society as "basically an intri- 
cate web of various intermediary communities each of which 
has a tenacious hold on the lives of its individual members and 
a relatively strong group autonomy vis-a-vis the state, i.e., the 
ability to maintain its internal order by extralegal and informal 
sanctions." If the American reporter (and American General 
Reporter) tend to take the degree of individual liberty they 
enjoy for granted while expressing concern about its extremes, 
the Japanese reporter, coming from the opposite starting point, 
confidently assumes "the communitarian character of contem- 
porary Japanese society" and warns of the consequences of 
overemphasis on the group. Yet it does not seem that Japanese 
communitarianism is characterized by associational activity in 
the Tocquevillean sense. 
The Japanese reporter draws his principal illustrations of 
Japanese communitarianism and its excesses from the world of 
work. The enterprise (kaisha), he states, has become the princi- 
pal community, o r  life-world, of many Japanese. It is "the most 
vigorous and dominant form of intermediary community in 
Japan today." The reporter vividly describes how the world of 
work-with its classlessness, its high degree of job security, 
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and its close cooperation between labor and management--has 
absorbed and deflected the energies and loyalties of many indi- 
viduals from other spheres of existence. 
The Japanese word kaishashugi ("company-ism") desig- 
nates the set of habits and attitudes that are associated with 
such highly absorptive occupational activity. That spirit often 
has been credited with a major role in Japan's economic suc- 
cess:' Recently, however, kaishashugi has also been implicat- 
ed in the phenomenon of karoshi--death from overwork, or, 
more precisely, death from diseases such as stroke and heart 
disease that are associated with a high degree of physical and 
psychological stress. Making imaginative use of Durkheim's 
analysis of the fundamental sociological causes of suicides, the 
Japanese reporter theorizes that instances of karoshi are not 
just isolated individual tragedies, but also revealing indicators 
of broader social conditions: "[Karoshi] symbolizes the tension 
and distress of a communitarian society"-not of the premodern 
sort, but of a new "hyperindustrialized and secularized" 
communitarian society. 
Though the English language has no equivalent word, the 
phenomenon of karoshi has also been documented in the Unit- 
ed States. A recent study shows that the working hours of the 
average American employee have risen steadily over the past 
twenty years, an increase that has affected nearly all workers 
across the entire spectrum of industries and o~cupations:~ In 
the manufacturing sector, an American worker now puts in the 
equivalent in hours of eight work-weeks more per year than his 
or her French or German counterpart, and eleven work-weeks 
more than a Swedish worker.49 (Japanese manufacturing and 
office employees work even harder, putting in the equivalent of 
almost six weeks more each year than A~nericans.~~) Accord- 
ing to Juliet Schor, "Americans are literally working them- 
selves to death-as jobs contribute t o  heart disease, hyperten- 
sion, gastric problems, depression, exhaustion, and a variety of 
other ailments."51 Schor blames the increase in overwork in 
47. See, in addition to the Japanese report, Ezra 3'. Vogel, Japan: Adaptive 
Comrmcniturianism, in IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
NINE COUNTRIES 141 (George C. Lodge & Ezra F. Vogel eds., 1987). 
48. JULIET B. SCHOR, W OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE 
OF LEISURE 1-2 (1991). 
49. Id. at 2, 153. 
50. Id. at 153-54. 
51. Id. at 11. 
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the United States chiefly on the inherent tendency of capitalist 
economies to generate strong pressures for long working hours. 
She attributes the difference between the United States and 
Western Europe to  American consumerism and a relatively 
weak union movement.52 Her analysis raises the question of 
the extent to which Japanese overwork, too, may be mainly the 
result of the imperatives of the capitalist economy, aggravated 
by Japanese communitarianism, largely unchecked by the coop- 
erative Japanese labor unions.53 It seems s i w c a n t  that in 
Europe, trade unions and labor-oriented parties have made the 
reduction of work time a major priority, have successfully 
fought for increased leisure time for employees," and have 
joined forces with family associations to secure the passage of 
maternity and family-leave laws. 
In the view of the Japanese reporter, Japanese 
communitarianism, as manifested above all in the workplace, 
but also in local community life and in the schools, has exacted 
too high a price from the individual. Precisely contrary to the 
American situation as presented by the American reporter and 
the General Reporter, he states that in Japan individual rights 
"are chronically endangered by the overgrowth andlor overpro- 
tection of intermediary communities." 
I t  is Micul t  t o  discern from the Japanese report, however, 
the precise status of small-scale noncommercial associations. 
The report describes one group, the kaisha, as "dominant," and 
other subgroups as relatively insular. The reporter writes of 
the need for "a richer form of human communality," and calls 
for a better balance among various communal spheres. If the 
kaisha absorbs most of a person's participatory energy and 
sense of social responsibility, he points out, not only will family 
life suffer, but s o  will local communal life. 
And, as Francis Fukuyama points out, there will be a toll 
on democratic government as well.55 Fukuyama, whose ac- 
count of Japanese emphasis on the group comports well with 
the description provided by the Japanese reporter, states, "The 
most significant challenge being posed t o  the liberal universal- 
52. Id. at 6, 9, 163. 
53. See id. at 6, 9. 
54. Id. at 81-82. 
55. Fukuyama writes of the "muting of democratic 'politics' " in a society such 
as Japan where "[tlhe emphasis on group harmony tends to push open confronta- 
tion to the fringes of politics." FUKWAMA, supm note 13, at 239-40. 
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ism of the American and French revolutions today is . . . [corn- 
ing] from those societies in Asia which combine liberal econo- 
mies with a kind of paternalistic auth~ri tar ianism.~ '~~ That 
particular hybrid (paternalistic capitalism), which Fukuyama 
describes as "perhaps never before seen in hi~tory,"~' seems 
actually to be in tension with a Tocquevillean communitar- 
ianism of flourishing local associations. We glimpse that ten- 
sion in the Japanese reporter's account of the Christian widow 
who was not permitted to designate her husband's final resting 
place. 
Thus, just as many Americans have concluded that the 
individual is jeopardized by excesses of individualism, the Jap- 
anese reporter concludes that authentic "human communality" 
is impoverished by a distorted communal structure. "Our com- 
munality flourishes in its fullness only if we foster and sustain 
our multiple belongingness to the different layers o r  spheres of 
our communal life, from family and friendship to occupational, 
religious and various voluntary associations to  local, ethnic, 
national, and global communities." 
IV. CONCLUSIONS: LAW AND SOCIAL ECOLOGY 
Despite differing historical legacies and cultural settings, all 
the liberal democracies represented here are wrestling with 
certain common problems. In all of their legal systems, what 
Sir Henry Maine wrote a century and a half ago seems to hold 
true today, though in varying degrees: 
The movement of progressive societies has been uniform in 
one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished 
by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the 
growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is 
steadily substituted for the Family as the unit of which the 
civil laws take account.58 
A generation after Maine remarked on the emergence of the 
free, self-determining individual from the confining network of 
family and group ties, Max Weber raised the question of 
whether that movement was but a passage into another sort of 
confinement-the "iron cage" of a rationalized and bureaucra- 
tized society.59 Today, individualism, rationalization (special- 
56. Id. at 238. 
57. Id. at 235. 
58. HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 139-40 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861). 
59. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181 
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ized division of labor), bureaucratization, and th .e market econ- 
omy can be seen to have exacted a significant toll on personal, 
social, and political life. As families and other communities of 
memory and mutual aid have become weaker, the individual 
has become more liberated, but also more vulnerable. In the 
developed nations today, an individual's economic security and 
social standing are decreasingly determined by his family and 
increasingly fixed by his occupation (or, if he is not employed, 
by his dependence on governmental large~se).~' As a result, 
unprecedented proportions of the population in liberal democra- 
cies are dependent on large bureaucratic organizations of one 
form or another. The contrast is great with the situation in 
many parts of the less-developed world where an individual's 
status and security are still highly dependent on kinship ties 
and group alliances. 
In most of Europe, though, the processes remarked by 
Maine and Weber were already well-advanced in the nine- 
teenth century. At the turn of the century, Emile Durkheim, 
who shared Tocqueville's belief in  the importance of 
associational life, asserted that local communities, religious 
groups, and families were in irreversible decline. He wrote, 
"[Tlhe bonds attaching us [to communities] become daily more 
fragile and more slack.'"jl Religions, he thought, were losing 
much of their authority and effectiveness, while families were 
becoming "just a number of individuals united by bonds of mu- 
tual affe~tion."~~ As Durkheim explained it: 
Once, when each local environment was more or less closed to 
others by usages, traditions, the scarcity of communications, 
each generation remained perforce in its place of origin or at 
least could not move far form it. But as these barriers vanish, 
as these small environments are levelled and blended with 
one another, the individuals inevitably disperse in accordance 
with their ambitions and to further their interests into the 
wider space now open to them.63 
The most promising theater for associational activity that re- 
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1930). 
60. See MARY ANN GLENDON, TIE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 1-2 
(1981). 
61. DuRKHEIM, supra note 13, at 27. 
62. EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 377-78 (John A. Spaulding & George Simpson 
trans., Free Press 1966) (1897). 
63. Id. at 378. 
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mained in the modern world, according to Durkheim, was the 
world of work. The only intermediate groups that seemed to 
him capable of providing social cohesion and meeting the needs 
of individuals for fellowship were "occupational associa- 
tions"-by which he meant, not labor unions or enterprises as 
such, but groups of individuals who cooperate in the same 
profession, trade, or oc~upat ion.~~ 
I t  seems significant that more of the National Reporters 
chose t o  address the world of work than any other aspect of the 
conference topic. Their gravitation toward that subject should 
not be surprising, for in the nations represented here the busi- 
ness world and the workplace have become the primary social 
arenas. As Durkheim foresaw, these are the places where many 
men and women now spend most of their waking hours, where 
they meet and talk with others, and where they form many of 
their opinions and values. Unfortunately, the workplace also 
seems to be draining more and more of the energies that men 
and women might devote elsewhere-to raising their children 
or to participating in civic life. 
Though Durkheim was prescient about the centrality of 
occupational life, he seems not t o  have realized how vulnerable 
it, too, would be to the modernizing forces that weakened other 
social groups. No form of associational life could remain un- 
touched by the processes of rationalization and bureaucratiza- 
tion, or by the geographical, social, and economic mobility that 
characterizes all modern and modernizing societies in varying 
degrees. Moreover, the fraying of one set of connections seemed 
to produce stresses and breaks in the others. Just as families, 
schools, churches, small businesses, union locals, and communi- 
ty associations can synergistically reinforce one another, weak- 
nesses in each can undermine the fragile ecology on which all 
depend. 
The principal question that emerges from the reports is 
whether the weakening of communities of memory and mutual 
aid should be regarded as a kind of "environmental problem." 
After all, is this erosion of small social environments not sim- 
ply the inevitable consequence of the inexorable advance of mo- 
dernity? Is it not just a necessary step in the movement to 
universal liberal democracy that some have called the end of 
history?65 On these points, the far-sighted Tocqueville pointed 
64. Id. at 378-84. 
65. See F~KUYAMA, supm note -13, at xi. 
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out that it matters a good deal what kind of democracy comes 
into being: the democratic project might fulfil the hopes of hu- 
mankind for equality in liberty or it might lead, in certain 
circumstances, to equality in servitude.66 He maintained that 
the health of small social subsystems is important to the health 
of the world's diverse experiments in democratic government. 
But does that claim hold up under contemporary circumstanc- 
es? Some of the most visible and powerful voluntary associa- 
tions in the modern world are those through which special 
interests circumvent or distort democratic processes. Moreover, 
if the sorts of associations that Tocqueville had in mind remain 
small enough to  command the enthusiasm and involvement of 
their members, they are apt to be ineffective in modern politics. 
Nevertheless, a persuasive case can still be made for the 
proposition that individual freedom, the rule of law, the welfare 
state, and healthy markets all depend in crucial ways on the 
condition of the fine texture of civil society. Regimes of rights, 
democratic governments, systems of entitlements, and market 
ordering all silently depend on habits, practices, and attitudes 
that are nurtured in nonmarket and nonpolitical institutions. 
Effective protection for individual rights requires citizens who 
are willing to respect the rights of others even at some cost to 
themselves. Genuine democracy requires a citizenry capable of 
participating in civic life, as well as men and women willing to 
devote some of their skills to public service. A workable welfare 
state needs citizens with enough fellow feeling to reach out to 
others in need, but with enough sense of responsibility to as- 
sume substantial control over their own lives. The market 
economy depends on a certain work ethic, as well as a network 
of social understandings and practices that permit reliable 
planning and promote the security of transactions. The 
pluralistic nature of most societies requires, in addition, citi- 
zens who are able to respect and appreciate the cultural, eth- 
nic, and religious heritage of others. 
Neither historical nor comparative investigation has un- 
earthed examples of institutions that can take the place of 
families, neighborhoods, and workplace and religious associa- 
tions as places where these skills and virtues can be generated, 
shaped, transformed, and transmitted from one generation to 
the next. Thus, paradoxically, liberal democratic welfare states 
66. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 57, 506. 
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seem to require the maintenance in their midst of value-gener- 
ating institutions that are not necessarily organized on liberal 
p r in~ ip le s .~~  Yet, perversely, the liberal state and the free 
market seem to undermine the social supports upon which they 
rest. As Fukuyama puts it, "Liberal principles have had a cor- 
rosive effect on the values predating liberalism that are needed 
to sustain strong communities, and thereby on a liberal 
society's ability to be self-s~staining.'~~ The analogies to unre- 
strained consumption of the world's once-abundant natural 
resources are suggestive 
But if we are in the presence of a species of environmental 
problem involving endangered social resources, to what extent, 
if at all, can lawyers as such contribute to  improvements? How 
could law help to maintain or bring about a better balance in 
the complex ecology of state, civil society, market economy, and 
individual rights? What would an optimal balance look like? By 
what standards could it be measured? Can government protect 
the relative autonomy of social subsystems without promoting 
their excesses? Can it regulate them without co-opting or de- 
stroying them? Do we even know how t o  avoid harm to social 
environments while carrying out seemingly unrelated govern- 
mental activities? Merely to pose such questions is to realize 
the primitive state of our knowledge about the ways in which 
the legal system intersects with the criss-crossing networks of 
associations and relationships that constitute the fine grain of 
society, and about the efficacy and limits of law in general. 
Nevertheless, the reports document the emergence of vari- 
ous sorts of what might be called "social environmental law." 
The Belgian reporter remarks that, 'What is interesting above 
all is  the extent to which measures [affecting families] tend to 
be preventive as well as reparatory and that they attempt to 
associate families and the state in complementary roles, espe- 
cially in their efforts to reconcile family responsibilities and 
occupational life." Polish administrative law, French employ- 
ment law, and German Codetermination law illustrate various 
efforts to establish frameworks and set conditions for organiza- 
tional life by top-down regulation. The idea that a flourishing 
67. Cf. FURWAMA, supra note 13, at 222 ("Successful political modernization 
thus requires the preservation of something premodern within its framework of 
rights and constitutional arrangements, the survival of peoples, and the incomplete 
victory of states."); see also id. at 334. 
68. Id. at 327. 
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organizational life might be more effectively promoted by re- 
fraining from direct regulation, and by trying to set conditions 
for self-government from the bottom-up, characterizes older 
American, and some newer French, labor law. An ecological 
approach is also noted by the Belgian reporter in European 
family policies that consciously address family environ- 
ments-housing law, tenant protection, zoning, etc. Several 
countries are experimenting with the idea that using nongov- 
ernmental organizations to deliver social services may not only 
be more economical, effective, and humane than direct govern- 
mental action, but might also promote the vitality of the orga- 
nizations concerned. 
As the epigraph from Tocqueville a t  the outset of this Gen- 
eral Report reminds us, the problems treated a t  this conference 
tend to escape the notice of those whose eyes are trained on 
large economic and political systems. In the century and a half 
since Tocqueville called attention t o  the political importance of 
small-scale associations, they have remained more or less ne- 
glected in legal and political theory. Thus it seems no small 
accomplishment that the national reports presented here pro- 
vide us with a fuller picture of their legal existence. It is worth 
noting that the word "paradox" recurs so frequently in the 
national reports. That is a sign, not only of the difficulties the 
reporters encountered with an awkward and unfamiliar topic, 
but of the opportunities for further comparative research. For 
paradox may be the very stimulus that can move legal science 
from what the German reporter has called "the comforting 
twilight of closure and openness, separation and inter- 
wovenness, autonomy and interdependen~e"~~ into the sunlit 
world of experiencing, understanding, judging, and acting."' 
The great question is how, precisely, does one make that 
move? The reports confirm that comparative methods can help 
us to see issues and problems that may not be picked up by 
other research strategies; and to make connections that may 
remain invisible to those who confine themselves to  the settled 
categories of a single national legal system. I t  is no coincidence 
that i t  was a foreign visitor to Jacksonian America who was 
able to acquaint generations of American and European read- 
69. Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1992). 
70. See BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
(1978) (especially ch. 17, "Metaphysics as Dialectic"). 
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ers with aspects of their own respective cultures that are so 
familiar as to escape attention. But the question remains 
whether comparative methods, after taking us deep into the 
twisted labyrinths of law, behavior, and attitudes, can also help 
to lead us out of them? Or do they merely sweep us into a diz- 
zying spiral where everything is both cause and effect; different 
from, but similar to, everything else; separate but intertwined; 
constituted by and constitutive of everything else; and so on? A 
sojourn in the disorienting twilight-zone of postmodernism 
might well make one long for von Jhering's "Heaven of Concep- 
tual Jurisprudence" with its hairsplitting machines and inter- 
pretation presses.71 
Teubner puts his finger on the problem when he points out 
that fancy legal and social theory in recent years has often lost 
track of what is distinctively legal, which in turn has made it 
difficult for theorists to develop any coherent concept of the 
relations between social and legal phenomena.72 To move be- 
yond that impasse is likely to require patient empirical work, a 
good ear for "the multiplicity of social  discourse^,"^^ and a 
high tolerance for interdisciplinary cooperation. Comparatists 
cannot claim a monopoly on these qualities, but their tradi- 
tional strengths do assure that they will have much t o  contrib- 
ute to basic research in law. So far as practical applications are 
concerned, the liberal democracies seem to be entering an era 
of experiments with new divisions of labor among larger and 
smaller public and private structures-at local, national, and 
international levels. Again, comparatists do not hold the patent 
on knowledge about forms of federalism and subsidiarity, but 
they will have much to contribute to, and learn from, these 
efforts to give bureaucracy a human face. 
No doubt, comparative law will remain unappealing to 
scholars in search of clear-cut solutions, quick fixes, or rapid 
career advancement. On the other hand, legal fashions do 
change. It is not inconceivable that someday law schools may 
once again invite students to submit to a hard apprenticeship 
in a difficult discipline, and that such an invitation may be 
accepted. If so, comparative law presumably will garner its 
share of apprentices. I was impressed, in this connection, by an 
observation of the Polish reporter, Miroslaw Wyrzykowski. 
71. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 33, at 70-72. 
72. Teubner, supra note 69, at 1449. 
73. Id. at 1462. 
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Warning that it is unreasonable to expect liberal democracy to 
rise full-blown from the ruins of socialism, Professor 
Wyrzykowski alluded to Moses' forty-year pilgrimage from 
slavery in Egypt to the promised land. The story is an especial- 
ly appropriate one to recall on this occasion, for the American 
Comparative Law Society and the International Association of 
Legal Science are just entering their forties. To my mind, the 
most poignant detail of the biblical account of the wanderings 
of Israel in the desert is that Moses himself never entered the 
promised land, but only glimpsed i t  from afar.74 And so it is 
with the journeys we undertake in any serious form of re- 
search. From time to time, we have glimpses that lift our 
hearts and gladden our spirits, but the pilgrimage continues. 
74. See Deuteronomy 34. 
